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ABSTRACT 
This paper tests the weak-form global market efficiency, by comparing the 
returns of technical trading strategies to the returns of buy-and-hold strategies on 24 
country indexes and 1 world index. The technical trading strategies examined in this 
paper include static and dynamic momentum approaches, oscillation strategy, and 
Relative Strength Index strategy. Empirical testing suggests that it is possible for the 
trading strategies to sigruficantly outperform the buy-and-hold strategy in 
some country indexes and even the world index. However, no excessive profits are 
extracted in United States and Germany from all the technical trading strategies, noting 
that these countries are weak-form efficient in the context of this paper. Furthermore, 
the techrucal trading strategies do not work well during extreme expansionary periods, 
but they are useful in filtering losses during recessionary periods. 
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s -  
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the nth observation / each specific time 
excessive profit 
daily difference of stock price 
exponential moving average 
relative strength index 
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mean-reversion 
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the mean under null hypothesis 
standard deviation 
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c = each specific country 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1970, Fama's work called "Efficient Capital Markets: a Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work" created a financial field of study of market efficiency. He distinguishes 
financial markets into three forms of market efficiency - the strong form, the semi- 
strong-form, and the weak-form market efficiency. The efficient market is defined as the 
market where the stock prices would always "fully reflect" all available information. 
The weak-form market efficiency, which this paper focuses on, is more specifically 
defined as a situation where past prices and returns cannot predict the future price and 
return. In other words, the technical analysis is worthless as it is impossible to 
consistently extract excessive profits using the chart, the trend, the historic prices, and 
the statistical analysis. 
Many studies were published regarding testing the weak-form market efficiency. 
In order to show weak-form market inefficiency, the studies have tried to uncover 
evidences of abnormal profits from technical analyses. Thaler (1987) approaches it 
through the January effect and Thaler (1987), French (1980) also examine the anomalies 
associated with weekend, holiday, turn of the month, and intraday effects. Some 
analysts employ the performance ratios like price-earning ratio, and price-to-book ratio. 
Some use momentum and mean-reversion strategies, which will be discussed in later 
sections of this paper. Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) employ the test with return 
predictability from macrovariables. Some of these studies show market inefficiency, but 
some of the evidence are mixed. 
This paper in general will employ two types of technical analysis strategies: the 
momentum strategy and the mean-reversion strategy. The momentum anomaly will 
branch out into the static, semi-dynamic, and dynamic momentum strategies and also 
the oscillation strategy. The mean-reversion anomaly will branch out into the Relative 
Strength Index strategy. 
The purpose of the paper is to test the global weak-form market efficiency. 
Twenty-four country indexes and one world index were used to test the theory. There 
are a total of seven technical trading strategies and 25 global indexes. A total of 175 tests 
of weak-form market efficiency exists. A proof of significance for these tests indicates 
the possibility of extracting excessive profits from technical analysis. In this 21st century 
of high globalization, fund managers should maximize the value of their portfolio by 
diversifying investment globally. The result of this paper could enhance the 
understanding of the market efficiency level of each country, which could be very useful 
in making investment decisions. 
The structure of this paper begins with the overview of the momentum and the 
mean-reversion anomaly. Then section 3 will describe empirical approach and the 
methodology used to test the weak-form market efficient theory. Section 4 will describe 
the data, and then followed by the results of the technical trading strateges and the 
market efficiency. The last section, section 6, will discuss and conclude the findings of 
this paper. 
2 OVERVIEW OF MOMENTUM AND MEAN- 
REVERSION 
One of the earliest researchers to use ordinary least squares to estimate market 
return were Scholes and Williams (1977). They discovered autocorrelation in stock 
prices - return of last period will explain the return of current period - this is generally 
known as the momentum. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) tried to exploit this anomaly to 
set up an investment strategy. They grouped all stocks from January 1963 to December 
1989 traded on the NYSE into deciles base on the prior six-month return and compared 
the returns of all deciles in the next six-months. They discovered that the best prior 
return decile outperformed worst return decile by 10 percent on an annual basis. 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) ranked all stocks traded on the NYSE by their prior 
three-year cumulative return and formed a "winner" portfolio and a "loser" portfolio, 
each consisting of 35 best and worst return stocks. They then discovered that the 
average annual return of the loser portfolio is higher than the average return of the 
winner portfolio by about 8 percent per year. This behavior is defined as long-term 
mean-reversion. 
The momentum and the mean-reversion behaviors contradict since one predicts 
a loser stock is likely to performing poorly while the other predicts it is likely to revert as 
a winner. The only difference between the tests lies in the length of period of return 
observed in forming the best or worse portfolio, which are six monthes in Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) and three years in De Bondt and Thaler (1985). It poses a question of what 
determines the momentum and what determines the mean-reversion. 
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) transformed the evidence in momentum 
and mean-reversion into a very simple model, similar to Hong, Lim, and Stein (1999, 
2000). However it contains assumption that earning moves between two "regimes": 
earnings are mean-reverting and earnings are trended. The transition probability of the 
regimes, and also the statistical properties of the earning process in each regime, are 
embedded in the investors' mind. In any given period, the firm's earnings are likely to 
stay in a given regime and investors use this information to update their beliefs about 
the regime they are in. Although this model does not explain the reasons, it blueprints 
the fields to explain momentum and mean-reversion. 
2.1 Explanations of Momentum 
First, some researchers attribute momentum behaviour to data snooping. 
Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994) view the autocorrelation in the return as a 
result of measurement error, and has nothing to do with the fundamentals. The 
measurement errors include non-synchronous trades and price discreteness. They also 
suggest that the momentum could be a result of off-market trade and trade mechanisms 
in different market structures. However, Conrad and Kaul(1989) showed that 
autocorrelation cannot be the result of market error and non-synchronous trading. 
Opposing view of Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994) describe the 
market as inefficient and generated a list of possible explanations. Watkins (2002) 
attributes the consistency in stock returns to information diffusion. Hong, Lim, and 
Stein (2000) built a model to explain the momentum behavior in stock prices. They 
created a world of two types of agents: "newswatcher" and "momentum traders." Each 
type of agent is only able to "process" some subset of the available public information. 
The newswatchers make forecasts based on their private signals about future 
fundamentals and the momentum traders forecast prices conditional on past price 
changes. In this world, to possibly reflect the real market, private dormation diffuses 
gradually across the newswatcher population. Only when newswatchers are actively 
looking after the prices do prices adjust slowly to new information. This comes 
momentum, caused by inadequate information diffusion or underreaction. This theory 
is also supported by Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermer (1995) and Boudoukh, Richardson, 
and Whitelaw (1994). 
Watkin (2002) also attributes the cause of momentum to discount rates. A better 
explanatory model is from Berk, Green, and Naik (1999). They compute the firm's value 
based on the net cash flow. Cash flow at each period will be the sum of cash flow from 
all of the projects from the firm. Risky projects and conservative projects exist, but they 
are discounted by the same discount rate. As likely in the short-term that the firm 
invests in new projects that have similar risk structure and that there is no default in 
cash flow, the return in stock will reflect the discount rate. It creates persistence in the 
trend of stock price. 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) suggest the cause of the positive autocorrelation, or 
momentum effect, to be drequent trading. They point out that small capitalization 
stocks trade less frequently than large stocks. When common factors affect the whole 
market, information injects faster into large capitalization stock price and slowly strew 
to the small stock. As result, serial correlation appears in the stock price. Those 
common factors could be dividend yield, default spread, yield on three month t-bill, and 
term structure spread as mentioned in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002). 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) argue that the anomaly should not be attributed to 
delayed stock price reactions to common factors. Instead they state that the delay in 
price reactions is a result of firm-specific information. This belief is also supported by 
Conrad and Kaul(1998). On a more macro level, Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2003) claim 
that large portion of the firm-specific momentum can be explained by industry 
momentum. Further, Lakonishok (1994) looks deeply into the firm's ratios involving 
stock prices proxy for past performance to explain the momentum behavior. 
Nevertheless, evidence in Grundy and Martin (2001) suggests momentum is not 
explained by time varying factors (such as common factors), cross-sectional differences 
(firm's specifics), or industry effects. Grundy and Martin (1998) show that the 
momentum should be predicted by trading volume. A study by Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) discovered that past trading volume influences both the magnitude and the 
persistence of future price momentum. Specifically, high (low) volume winners (losers) 
experience fast momentum reversal. They then generate investment strategies 
conditional on past volume, and find out if past trading volume is useful to reconcile 
short-term "underreaction" and long-term "overreaction" effects. Aside from this, Lee 
and Swaminathan (2000) use the trading volume to discover more anomalies. 
In addition, a sigruficant number of the explanations for momentum falls into the 
field of investor psychology. One of the simple psychological explanations identified by 
Edwards (1968) is the "conservatism" - individuals dislike changes and slowly accept 
new evidence. He also points out that opinion change is very orderly, but it is 
insufficient in amount. This describes the situation where investor behavior slowly 
reflects new information in the stock prices. 
Another psychological explanation is "overconfidence." Overconfidence is 
derived from a large body of evidence from cognitive psychological experiments and 
surveys which shows that individuals overestimate their own abilities. Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) consider that overconfident investors give too 
much weight to the private signal. When public information signals arrive, investors 
only partially correct the price. As more public information arrives, stock prices will 
gradually move toward the full-information value, or the fundamental value. 
Furthermore, on a more advance level, as the overconfident investors observe the biased 
outcomes that are consistent with their expectations, they will update their confidence in 
a biased manner. This behavior is called "attribution theory." Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) say that as public information aligns with the private signals, 
investors will further overreact to the preceding private signal. As result, continuous 
overconfidence creates persistence in overreaction that lead to momentum in prices. 
Tversky and Kahneman, (1974) provide another psychologcal explanation as 
"representativeness heuristic." This theory says that a person evaluates the probability 
of an uncertain event, or a sample, by the degree to which it is (i) similar in its essential 
properties to the parent population, (ii) reflects the salient features of the process by 
which it is generated. To illustrate, if a company has a consistent history of return, 
accompanied by salient and enthusiastic descriptions of its success, investors may view 
that the past history is representative of return. Perhaps the returns are just from a 
random process with a few lucky successes; investors see "order among chaos" and 
conclude returns as a path from past return. 
2.2 Explanations of Mean-Reversion 
According to Fama and French (1987), if returns are generated by the 
combination of a random walk and a stationary mean-reverting process, the serial 
correlation of the stock price will be a U-shaped function of the holding period. The 
first-order autocorrelation becomes more negative as shorter holding periods lengthen, 
but it gradually returns to zero for longer holding periods because the random walk 
component dominates. The curvature of this U-shaped function depends on the relative 
variability of the random walk and mean-reverting components. Fama and French's 
(1987) parameter estimates imply that the autocorrelation coefficient is monotonically 
decreasing for holding periods up to three years. That is, the mean-reversion occurs at a 
holding period greater than or equal to three years. However, there is also short-term 
mean reversion as pointed out by Lo and MacKinlay (1988). 
Among all the explanations, there is always a group of people who believe that 
mean-reversion is data mining and does not exist. Fama and French (1988a) discover 
that autocorrelation for 3- to 5-year returns for 1926-1985 is strongly negative. However, 
if the sample ranges from 1926-1940, the evidence of strong negative autocorrelation in 
3- to 5-year returns disappears. Likewise, Zarowin (1989) finds no evidence that in small 
stocks, often losers, have higher expected returns than large stocks, often winners. 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2003) and Jegadeesh (1990) believe that some portion 
of the short-term return reversals is driven by microstructure biases such as bid-ask 
bounce. Kaul and Nimalendram (1990) show that bid-ask errors lead to spurious 
volatility in transaction returns and about half of the daily return variance can be 
induced by the bid-ask spread. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2003) and Lenmann (1990) 
also believe that mean-reversion is a result of liquidity. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2003) 
observe that some stocks are illiquid at the end of December. Overreaction will take 
time in January and will create mean-reversion. 
A sigruficant group of researchers believe that overreaction contributes to mean 
reversion. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) define overreaction as when an investor has 
weighted too much on past performance of a firm and the return should revert. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982), using experimental psychology, notice that people tend 
to overreact to unexpected and dramatic events. Fama and French (1996) believe that 
the three-factor model can account for the overreaction evidence. Chopra, Lakonishok, 
and Ritter (1992) discover that overreaction effect is substantially stronger for smaller 
firms than for large firms. Even after adjusting for size and beta, overreaction remains. 
In addition, overreaction could be a result of accumulation of underreactions. 
Hong and Stein (1999) state, "Every existence of underreaction sows the seeds for 
overreaction." Virtually, all the momentum explanations discussed in the previous 
section could lead to overreaction. At one unpredictable time, the stock price will mean- 
revert. 
Another class of explanation is tax loss trading. Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2003) 
suggest that at the end of December, fund managers sell off losing stocks to reduce 
realized capital gain tax or increase tax credit. Stock selling at the end of December will 
create loser persistence in December and reversals in January. However their model 
does not explain that the winners revert because investors do not sell winning stock to 
reduce tax. Constantiniedes (1984) argues that the tax loss selling at the end of the year 
is irrelevant. 
Fischer (1999) states that volatility in stock today is can be partially attributed to 
window dressing. Close to each quarter, fund managers try to make their funds look 
attractive before disclosing an updated list of investment holdings. So they will buy 
recent hot winners and sell their losers. This action deceives potential and current 
investors. Later after the disclosure, they will sell the winner and may buy back the 
loser, creating a short-term mean-reversion. 
Several researchers explain the mean-reversion with risk structure. Recall the net 
cash flow model in the momentum section: a firm's value depends on a sequence of cash 
flows discounted by a risk factor. Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) suggest that as the firm 
loses a particularly low-risk project, the average risk will rise. The firm's value will drop 
suddenly from the net cash flow method valuation. This theory is supported by 
DeBondt and Tthaler (1987). Also, Chan (1998) finds empirical evidence supporting this 
theory - losers' betas increase after a period of abnormal loss and winners' betas 
decrease after a period of abnormal gain. Chan's strategy of buying high betas and 
selling low betas generates excess return. Nonetheless, he points out that the return is 
likely to the compensation of high risky strategy. 
Lehmann (1990) attributes the mean-reversion to difference in size of the firm. 
Although he found out the losers outperform winners by 16.6%, when poor earners are 
matched with winners of equal size, there is little difference in the return. 
Lee and Swaminathan (2000) look at the mean-reversion and momentum 
behaviors to the volume traded. They find low volume stock outperform high volume 
stock. Among winners, low volume stocks show greater persistence in price 
momentum. Among losers, high volume stocks show greater persistence in price 
momentum. In addition, low volume stocks are commonly associated with value stocks. 
High volume stocks are commonly associated with glamour stocks. Mean-reversion 
likely appears as stocks reach extreme high volume and extreme low volume. 
3 METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
Under the weak-market efficiency hypothesis, no excessive returns could be 
extracted from technical analysis. This paper, in an attempt to reject this hypothesis, will 
form a total of seven technical trading strategies and examine the returns of these 
strategies over the simply buy and hold strategy. The design of this test is the Matched 
Pairs t Procedure or, intuitively, the mean difference test. 
Each year in the data of daily global price indexes, seven returns of the technical 
trading strategies and one return of the buy and hold strategy will be generated. The 
number of years in the price index data will be the number of observations, "N." The 
annual return of each technical trading strategy is denoted "Kin" where subscript "c" 
represents the country, "if' represents one of the seven technical trading strategies, and 
"n" represents the nth year or the time series of the observation. Similarly, the annual 
return of the buy and hold strategy is denoted "R&nt'. As result, the difference or the 
excessive return will be "I& - Rchnll, or denoted "Dci,". The Matched Pairs t statistic is 
therefore: 
t .  = Di - pi , (Moore 1995. p419) 
' s i / a  
in which q. is the mean of "Dcin" and "si" is the sample standard deviation of "Dci/. 
Under the null hypothesis that the excessive return is zero, or pi =0, the Matched Pairs t 
statistic will be: 
The test is designed to be one-tailed as this paper focuses on the possibility of 
over-performing the buy and hold strategy. A significant rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates that the typical technical trading strategy makes it possible to 
extract excessive profits out of the normal buy and hold strategy; therefore, the market is 
not weak-form efficient. In contrast, a failure to reject the hypothesis indicates there is 
not enough evidence to prove that the market is weak-form inefficient. 
Under this type of efficient market testing, the necessity of the market rate and 
the risk free rate is not required. This method avoids the problem of selecting the 
market proxy as mentioned in Roll's (1978) critique. The next section will outline the 
seven technical strategies: 3-day static momentum strategy, 6-day static momentum 
strategy, 12-day static momentum strategy, semi-dynamic momentum strategy, dynamic 
momentum strategy, oscillation strategy, and the relative strength index strategy. 
Several assumptions and actions apply to all seven strategies: 
(1) All the technical trading strategies employ ex ante variables, so the 
buying and selling signals can realistically serve as the forecasts of the 
future price movement based on the past price performance. 
(2) To avoid time lag, the buy and sell actions are implemented immediately 
when the signals appear. Realistically, if  the reference price is the close price, 
the confirmation of the signal takes time 1 minute before the close, and the 
actual buy action is executed at the last minute. This action is superior to the 
buy/sell at the open price as the price difference between the close and the 
next open could be substantially large. 
(3) The distribution of the security return is assumed to be log-normal; and the 
daily security difference is assumed to be normally distributed. 
3.1 Static Momentum Strategy 
As the name suggests, static momentum strategies stem from the momentum 
anomaly. It is based on the belief that the price persists over time. All of the static 
momentum strateges in this paper embed the following four propositions: 
(1) The word "static" describes the circumstance that the buy signals and 
the sell signals do not respond to the qualitative price movements. 
The static momentum strategy is based on the belief that stock price 
movements are persistent in the "direction" of the change, and not in 
the "performance" of the price change. 
(2) The number "n" in the "n-day static momentum strategy" refers to 
the observation period. This strategy supposes that the buy signals 
appear when at least 67% of the observation days' returns are 
positive. For instance, in the Sday static momentum strategy, the buy 
signals appear when at least 2 days' returns out of 3 days are positive. 
As a result, two initiative buy signal are generated at "n" when (n-2, 
n-1,n) is (-,+,+) and (+,-,+). 
(3) The holding period for each buy signal is 3 days. 
(4) Continual update of the buy signals applies. Take an example when the 
return for the past 9 periods (n-8,n-7,n-6,n-5,n-4,n-3,n-2,n-I,n) is (-,-,+,+,+,+,-,- 
,+); if the observation period is 6 days, then the initial buy action will take 
time at the close of "n-3" and hold until the end at "n". Nevertheless, the buy 
signal is still active at "n," as the returns of 4 days out of 6 are positive, the 
hold will continue at "n" until the signal is off at "n+3", "n+6", etc. 
3.1.1 3-Day Static Momentum Strategy 
The 3-day static momentum stresses the belief that momentum occurs in the 
fairly short term, around a week. This strategy will automatically buy the stock when 
the past return at (n-2,n-1,n) is (-,+,+) and (+,-,+); and will continue to hold when the 
return is (+,+,-). 
3.1.2 6-Day Static Momentum Strategy 
The 6-day static momentum, compared to the 3-day one, is a bit conservative and 
requires 6 days of observation before entering a trade. The buy actions take place when 
at least 4 days' returns out of 6 days are positive. The holding period is still 3 days. As 
result, the trade frequency will be smaller. 
3.1.3 12-Day Static Momentum Strategy 
The 12-day static momentum, compared to the other two, is the most 
conservative as it searches for signs in the past 12 days and holds the security for only 3 
days. The buy actions take place when at least 8 days' returns out of 12 days are 
positive. 
3.2 Semi-Dynamic Momentum Strategy 
One of the salient shortcomings of the pure static strategy is the lack of 
consideration of the performance measure. The semi-dynamic momentum strategy 
eliminates this deficiency by implementing magnitude-sensitive buy signals. It is 
"dynamic" as the buy signals can change. However, the holding period remains 3 days, 
so it is semi-dynamic. 
The buy signals are formed through statistical process. In general, the buy signal 
is generated when: 
* DD,, 2 PC, + t I-a,~-l , l  X 
in which "DDC," is the daily difference of the security price of country "c" at time "nu; 
" N  is the number of observation days; " p,, " is the mean of the DDcn for the past " N  
observation days; " " is the standard error of the DDcn for the past "N" 
observation days; and " t*l-a,~-~,l'l is the critical t value for 1-alpha confident, N-1 
degrees of freedom, and one-tailed test. As the general model of buy signal is formed, 
the next step will be to quantify the variables used in the paper: 
(1) The DD,, will be the security price at "n" minus the security price at "n-1". 
(2) The number of observation days, "Nu, is set to be 20. It is an arbitrary 
number. If " N  becomes larger, then the mean and standard error of the 
DDc, become stable. If " N  becomes smaller, the mean and standard error of 
the DDcn will be volatile, adding risk to the buy signals. 
(3) The " p,, "and " " keep updating as newly security price change joins 
the calculation and the 215t past observation fade out. 
(4) An arbitrary critical p-value (or 1- alpha) of 90% is set. Then we can generate 
the critical value of t, "~*o.Io,I~,I~'  to be 1.34. 
Overall, to interpret the formula, if DDcn is greater than pCn + 1.34 x Sfm, 
then the probability of observing that typical DDc, will be at least 90%. This indicates 
that security price change is sigruficantly large, a signal that the price moment is in an 
upward trend, so it is the right time to buy the security. 
3.3 Dynamic Momentum Strategy 
Although the semi-dynamic strategy is better than the pure static one, there is a 
major pitfall in the selling of the security. Because the " p " keeps updating with the 
new price difference, a buy signal, indicating a sigruficant price increase, will raise the 
" p ". After the stock is sold on the third day, a continual buy signal and the next buy 
signal would require a greater price increase. Therefore, a successful buy will contest 
the next buy action. 
The dynamic momentum strategy goes one step further than the semi-dynamic 
strategy as, in addition to the buy signals, the sell signals are also determined by the 
security performance. It is fully dynamic as both the buy signals and sell signals can 
change. The buy signals are exactly identical to the buy signal of the semi-dynamic 
strategy. On the other hand, the sell signals are triggered when: 
The formula and the notations are the same as in the semi-dynamic strategy buy signal, 
except the inequality sign and the critical p-value. In this paper, an arbitrary critical p- 
value (or alpha) of 16% is used. Then the critical value of t, "t*0.16,19,1~~ will be -1.00. 
The overall interpretation will be that if daily difference of the security price is 
smaller than p,, - 1 .OO x '/$ (or price loss is greater than p, - 1 .OO x in 
absolute term), then the probability of observing that typical DDcn will be at most 16%. 
This indicates that security price change is sigruficantly small (the price loss is 
significantly large), a signal that the price upward moment ends, so it is the right time to 
sell the security. 
3.4 Oscillation Strategy 
According to Poitras (2005) "the term oscillator refers to a wide range of 
techniques that can be based on substantively different calculations and motivations. 
The unifying notion connecting the techniques is that the chart pattern calculated from 
the original price chart oscillates or fluctuates within a defined range." 
This paper will focus on the narrow definition found at www.futuresource.com 
(2004) which defines an oscillator as "the simple difference between two moving 
averages". A specific form is the dual exponential moving average. Generally, two 
different periods of exponential moving average (EMA) are formed: a slow EMA will 
cover a longer period, where price changes dilute slowly in the EMA; a fast EMA will 
cover a shorter period, so price changes incorporate faster in the EMA. When the fast 
EMA accelerates away the slower EMA, or when the difference of fast EMA and the 
slow EMA is positive, the security is described to be gaining momentum in the upward 
trend. When the fast EMA drops below the slower EMA, or when the difference of fast 
EMA and the slow EMA is negative, the security is described to show bearish trend. 
According to Schwager (1996, p.556): "Oscillators perform well when a market is in a 
trading range - that is, a sideways trend. They work poorly, however, when a market is 
in a strong uptrend or downtrend." 
The oscillation strategy in this paper employs the 5-day EMA as the fast EMA 
and the 20-day EMA as the slow EMA. The formula of the EMA suggested by Kaufman 
(1978) is: 
lP, +a<-, +a2%-, +. . .+aN- '~n-N+I 
EMA, = 
1 + a + a 2  +...+ aN-' 
where P, is the security price at "n" and "a" is set to be 0.5 in this paper. The use of the 
exponential is to put more weight on the recent price and less weight on the relatively 
historic price. The buy signals appear if the difference of the 5-day EMA and the 20-day 
EMA is positive. The sell signals appear when the difference is negative. 
3.5 Relative Strength Index Strategy 
The relative strength index (RSI) strategy can be used as both a momentum 
strategy and the mean-reversion strategy. It depends on the interpretation of the over- 
bought and the over-sold levels. For instance, the over-sold signals could be interpreted 
as a situation where the security price is below its fundamental value and is expected to 
go back to the fundamental level. On the other hand, the over-sold signals could be a 
signal of subsequent price fall. This paper will interpret the RSI as the mean-reversion 
strategy. Nevertheless, as the returns in this paper are expressed as log return, 
multiplying the RSI returns by a factor of negative one could shift the results from 
mean-reversion strategy to momentum strategy1. 
According to Schwager (1996, p542), "RSI compares the relative strength of price 
gains on days that close above the previous day's close to price losses on days that close 
below the previous day's close." The process of calculating the relative strength index is 
detailed as follows: 
(1) The RSI can be constructed with any number of observation days; a 9-day 
period is used in this paper. A shorter observation period induces faster and 
a more sensitive indicator, and vice versa. 
(2) An up average is formed by adding all the prices gained on the up days of 
the 9-day period and dividing the total by nine. 
(3) A down average is formed by adding all the absolute values of the prices lost 
on the down days of the 9-day period and dividing the total by nine. 
(4) A relative strength (RS) can be calculated by dividing the up average by the 
down average. 
(5) The following formula will lead to the RSI: 
RSI = 100 - [lo% + RSl] 
1 Substantial difference may occur as the alternative strategy would involve short-selling. 
An over-sold signal occurs when the RSI is very small. As down average 
dominates the up average, O<RS<l, so RSI will be smaller than 50. Inversely, an over- 
bought signal will result in a high RSI, 50<RSI<100. Since we interpret the RSI strategy 
as a mean-reversion strategy, the over-sold signals will be the buy signals and the over- 
bought signals will be the sell signals. The over-sold signals usually range from 20 to 30 
and the over-bought signals usually range form 70 to 80. This paper will arbitrarily pick 
the combination of (20,80) respectively. 
4 DATA 
As we are now in the high cross-border investment era, global market efficiency 
becomes more important. "If momentum exists globally, then a strategy that actively 
allocates funds from loser to winner markets might be more attractive than a globally 
diversified buy-and-hold strategy (Fong, Wong, and Lean, 2003)." This paper will 
examine the global weak-form market efficiency by testing the technical strategy return 
of 24 country indexes and 1 world index from the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) World Index. The 24 country indexes consist of Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, United Kingdom, and United States. All data are 
sourced from Datastream. 
"The MSCI World Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that 
is designed to measure global developed market equity performance (MSCI 2004)." 
Every MSCI index comprises large capitalization stocks and actively traded stocks, so 
the problems associated with illiquidity, bid-ask spreads, and non-synchronous trading 
biases are eliminated. Local prices are used in the indexes, thus returns will not be 
distorted by the exchange rate fluctuations. 
The price indexes are listed daily and the sample ranges from January 1989 to 
September 2004. Since only the daily closed price was provided, the daily return is 
formulated by comparing today's close price to that of the previous day. Due to the 
limitation of the data, a trade, following a signal, is assumed to be executed the moment 
before the close. An important assumption would be that there is no time lapse between 
the signal and the trade action. 
5 RESULTS AND SUMMARY 
5.1 Full Period Returns of the Technical Trade Strategies 
Table 1 in Appendix reports the performance of all the technical trade strategies 
and the buy and hold strategy for all the indexes through the whole 15 years sample 
period. All the returns are calculated in log form and expressed annually. 
5.1.1 The 3 Static Momentum Strategies 
Of all the technical trading strategies, those 3 static momentum strategies are 
comparable because their basics are the same and they only differ in the observation 
period. Among them, the most successful is the 3-day observation; it over-performs the 
buy and hold strategy for 15 out of 25 world indexes. There are only 10 over- 
performances in the 6-day strategy and only 8 in the 12-day strategy. Austria, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand are the countries where all the static 
momentum strateges succeed in beating the buy and hold. Most of them cluster in the 
South East Asian region. Nevertheless, up to this point we cannot conclude that these 
markets are inefficient because the buy and hold strategy only compare the prices of the 
initial trading day and the last one. The Asia Financial Crisis could be the blame for all 
of the static momentum strategies over-performance relative to the buy and hold. 
In addition, no salient trend is discovered in the number of observation days. 
Generally, as the observation period increases, the returns generally decrease, but there 
are lots of exceptions, so we cannot conclude any trend. However, a surprise appears in 
Japan as all 3 static momentum strategies result in negative returns. This could be 
understandable as the Japanese economy underwent suppression throughout the 1990's. 
Another surprise is found in the Netherlands and Spain; the returns are positive in 3-day 
observation and 12-day observation, but negative in the 6-day observation. The 
difference is quite high especially in Spain. 
5.1.2 The Other 4 Technical Trading Strategies 
We cannot cross-compare the semi-dynamic, the dynamic, the oscillation, and 
the RSI strategies. However, we can generally describe their performance. Of all 7 
strategies, the most successful one is the dynamic strategy as it over-performs the buy 
and hold for 23 country indexes and 1 world index. The only exception is United States 
(Please refer to table 2 in Appendix). The semi-dynamic over-performs in 16 indexes; 
oscillation strategy over-performs in 10 indexes. The relative strength index strategy 
does not over-perform in any index. The success in the dynamic strategy can be 
attributed to its ability to customize the trade signals with regard to the index 
performance. Under the dynamic strategy, we know that the return from Japan can be 
positive with a more customized strategy. 
Another interesting logic can be formed by comparing the semi-dynamic and the 
dynamic strategies: the selling signal is as important as the buy signal. A customized 
sell signal, as in the dynamic strategy, enhances the return in all indexes except Taiwan. 
We can now move onto the test result of the strategies. 
5.2 Return of All the Strategies Listed Yearly 
Table 3 averages all the returns across the 25 global indexes and expresses them 
year by year. Three distinctive observations are discovered: 
During the periods of negative buy and hold return, all of the technical 
trading strategies over-perform. It sigrufies that it is possible to filter the 
losses during a year. 
During the periods of moderate growth, some strategies over-perform and 
some under-perform. It varies strategy by strategy. 
During the periods of rapid growth, the technical strategies do not hammer 
the buy and hold strategy. The momentum in the indexes during the period 
is strong. An attempt to filter the anticipated losses inversely filters the 
gains. 
In conclusion, these technical trading strategies could be employed to hedge and 
eliminate the negative market risk. 
5.3 Test Result for the Static Momentum Strategy 
5.3.1 Test Result of the 3-Day Static Momentum Strategy 
Table 4 shows the result of the matched pair t statistic of the 3-day static 
momentum strategy. Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan reject the null hypothesis 
at 10% sigdicance; Canada, and Thailand reject it at 5% significance; in the extreme, 
Indonesia rejects the weak-form efficiency hypothesis at 1 % significance. Most of these 
countries are located in the South East Asian region. However, it is quite surprising that 
Canada is weak-form inefficient under this test. In contrast, Canada's neighbour, United 
States, shows the least excessive return. The 3-day static momentum strategy yields a 
loss of 9.08% compared to the buy and hold strategy. In addition, the standard error is 
2.26%, one of the lowest in the data; sigdying that the loss is consistent. 
5.3.2 Test Result of the 6-Day Static Momentum Strategy 
With the 6-day momentum strategy, only Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand are 
proven to be weak-form market inefficient. The Result is reported in Table 5. This time, 
again, the Indonesian market is proven to be weak-form inefficient. The excessive return 
from this strategy is 17.42%, better than that of the 3-day static momentum strategy with 
30.17%. The Netherlands and United States provide the least returns, -9.70% and -8.26 % 
respectively. 
5.3.3 Test Result of the 12-Day Static Momentum Strategy 
Table 6 reports the test for the 12-day static momentum strategy. None of the 
global markets is proven to be inefficient. Indeed, 17 out of the 25 markets show 
negative excessive returns anchoring the buy and hold strategy. The excessive return in 
Indonesia is actually larger than that in the 6-day static momentum strategy, but the 
standard error is much larger. Belgium, France, Hong Kong, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and United States report the least gain (most loss), but United Kingdom is 
proven to be most efficient in this test. 
5.4 Test Result for the Semi-Dynamic Momentum Strategy 
Table 7 shows that the semi-dynamic momentum strategy beats the buy and hold 
strategy in 9 country indexes and in the world index. The countries are Austria, Canada, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Norway, South Africa, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
On the other hand, Switzerland and the Netherlands are proven to be efficient under 
this test. 
5.5 Test Result for the Dynamic Momentum Strategy 
The result generated from this dynamic momentum strategy can significantly 
separate the inefficient market from the efficient ones. The result is shown in table 8. 
German and United States markets are the most efficient under this test as they are the 
only two that produce negative excessive returns. Of the remaining 23 indexes, 14 
significantly produce positive excessive return. Austria, Canada, Hong Kong, Italy, 
Korea, Malaysia, Norway, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden are inefficient at 
5% level. The world index, Indonesia, and Thailand are inefficient at 1 % level. The 
excessive return in Indonesia and Thailand are 40.58 % and 35.46 % respectively. 
Although the excessive return in the world index is only 13.28%, the standard error is 
quite low, making it highly sigruficant. It is surprising that Taiwan, proven to be weak- 
form market inefficient in the semi-dynamic strategy, appears to be efficient now. 
Perhaps, the bearish sentiments in the Taiwanese market arrived promptly, leaving the 
sell signals ineffective in exiting the market. 
5.6 Test Result for the Oscillation Strategy 
Table 9 shows the test result for the oscillation strategy. Only Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, and Thailand get significant excessive returns. Again, the Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, and United States are proven efficient under this test. 
5.7 Test Result for the Relative Strength Index Strategy 
Table 10 reports the test result for the relative strength index (RSI) strategy. If we 
interpret the RSI as a mean reversion indicator, then the result will show that all of the 
global markets are efficient. Nevertheless, the negative of the mean-reversion (MR) RSI 
strategy return is approximately equal to the return for the momentum (MM) RSI 
strategy. 
When: (MR-RSI Return) - (Buy and Hold Return) = (MR-Excessive Return), 
given that: (MM-RSI Return) = - (MR-RSI Return) , 
it follows: (MM-Excessive Return) = - (MR-Excessive Return) 
- 2(Buy and Hold Return). 
This explains why the excessive return for Indonesia is extremely negative; as it 
implies the high excessive return for the momentum RSI strategy. All in all, the low t- 
stat for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Switzerland, and Thailand can be translated into 
high t-stat under the momentum RSI strategy, indicating that markets are inefficient. 
When none of the mean reversion RSI excessive returns is positive, one may Infer that 
momentum anomaly dominates the mean reversion anomaly. However, further proof is 
required. 
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper investigates the global weak-form market efficiency through 
selections of technical analysis including the static, semi-dynamic, and dynamic 
momentum strategies, oscillation strategy, and the relative strength index strategy. As 
long as one of the tests shows that the market is inefficient, then the market is inefficient 
because it is possible to extract excessive profit based on technical analysis. Of the 24 
country indexes and 1 world index, only 10 are proven to be efficient as there are 
inadequate evidences to prove the existence of excessive profits beyond the buy and 
hold strategy. These 10 countries are Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. In the most 
extreme, none of the technical strategies employed in this paper produces positive 
excessive profits in United States and Germany. All of these countries are fully 
developed, and so are their financial sectors. The technical traders in these countries 
would have already swept the momentum and the mean-reversion anomaly, leaving no 
room for excessive profit under the strategies in the paper. On the other hand, the most 
sigruficant inefficient markets proven in this paper are Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. These countries are predominantly categorized as the "emerging markets"; 
inefficiency in their financial market is understandable. Through out the paper, Canada 
is actually considered inefficient as sigruficant excessive profits can be extracted in 3 of 
the 7 technical strategies. The physical distance of Canada and United States is very 
close, but the market efficiency is widely apart. 
This paper also discovered several properties of the trading strateges: 
First of all, trends are not discovered in the static momentum strategy as the 
number of observation days increase. The market characteristic in each 
country disturbs the trend in the global basis. 
The sell signals are as important as the buy signals. To illustrate, all the 
market returns increases significantly from the semi-dynamic strategy to the 
fully dynamic strategy, with the only exception of Taiwan. 
A more customization of the strategies results in better return. For example, 
dynamic strategy is better than the semi-dynamic one, which is also better 
than the pure static momentum strategies. 
Schwager's statement regarding oscillation does not coincide with the 
evidence in this paper. He mentions that "[olscillators perform well when a 
market is in a trading range - that is, a sideways trend. They work poorly, 
however, when a market is in a strong uptrend or downtrend. (Schwager 
1996, p.556)" Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, are markets in very strong 
uptrend or downtrend. However, their oscillation returns are the highest 
among all. 
However, another statement from Schwager found in this context regarding 
the relative strength index strategy: "Traders should not automatically sell 
markets that are over bought or buy markets that are oversold. Although 
such a strategy may work well in a trading-range market, it will be 
disastrous in a trending market. (Schwager 1996, p.524)" The mean- 
reversion RSI strategy employed in t h s  paper is based on the belief that an 
over-sold market would revert as a winner and that an over-bought market 
would revert as a loser. Indeed the returns in Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Thailand are drastically low. In strong trendy markets like them, over- 
bought should be treated as buy signals and vice versa. The RSI strategy 
should be best exploited as a momentum strategy. 
The result also demonstrates that the technical trading strateges work the best 
during the periods of negative market return and the periods of moderate growth. The 
possibility to filter losses during the negative market return period makes the strateges 
attractive for the fund managers trying to hedge their funds and minimizing downside 
risks. It signifies that it is possible to filter the losses during a year. In addition, as t h s  
paper demonstrates the sigruficance excessive profits, fund managers are encouraged to 
diversify their investments country-wisely and maximize the portfolio value in the 
inefficiency markets. 
APPENDIX - RESULT TABLES 
Table 1 The Performance of the 3 Static Momentum Strategies for the Whole 
Sample 15 Years. 
Index Strategy 
3 days Static 6 days Static 12 days Static 
Buy and Hold Momentum Momentum Momentum 
WORLD 
AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
DENMARK 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
HONG KONG 
INDONESIA 
ITALY 
JAPAN 
KOREA 
MALAYSIA 
NETHERLANDS 
NORWAY 
SINGAPORE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
TAIWAN 
THAILAND 
UK 
US 
Table 2 T h e  Performance of the  Semi-Dynamic, Dynamic, Oscillation, a n d  Relative 
Strength Index Strategies for  t h e  Whole  Sample  15 Years. 
Index 
WORLD 
AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
DENMARK 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
HONG KONG 
INDONESIA 
ITALY 
JAPAN 
KOREA 
MALAYSIA 
NETHERLANDS 
NORWAY 
SINGAPORE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
TAIWAN 
THAILAND 
UK 
us 
Strategy 
Semi- Relative 
Buy and Hold Dynamic Dynamic Oscillation Strength Index 
Table 3 Return of All the Strategies Listed Yearly 
Year 
Buy and 
Hold 
3-Day 
Static 
22.99% 
-0.32% 
6.49% 
-3.30% 
25.96% 
-0.44% 
12.31% 
3.82% 
0.78% 
13.24% 
22.30% 
-5.88% 
-9.49% 
-6.93% 
30.94% 
6-Day 
Static 
17.35% 
-0.58% 
11.48% 
-0.93% 
17.31 % 
-3.87% 
9.17% 
2.98% 
-6.27% 
-0.05% 
14.23% 
-6.70% 
-7.22% 
-8.98% 
18.69% 
12-Day 
Static 
11.48% 
2.22% 
6.02% 
-0.32% 
14.27% 
-2.73% 
4.50% 
2.55% 
4.01 % 
6.49% 
7.65% 
-5.38% 
-2.18% 
-6.73% 
17.35% 
Semi- 
Dynamic 
25.03% 
5.53% 
8.85% 
-0.21 % 
24.98% 
4.60% 
12.83% 
10.09% 
10.72% 
16.20% 
16.93% 
-2.58% 
-11.23% 
1.08% 
26.98% 
Dynamic 
21.86% 
19.12% 
18.78% 
5.97% 
29.38% 
10.16% 
13.61 % 
10.70% 
17.12% 
22.23% 
20.59% 
5.09% 
-0.75% 
9.36% 
23.62% 
Oscillation RSI 
21.98% 7.15% 
2.13% -12.16% 
10.08% 3.41% 
-0.49% -4.04% 
25.73% 10.97% 
-1.18% 0.41% 
9.82% 3.59% 
3.56% 2.02% 
-4.80% -15.52% 
3.36% -16.28% 
17.24% 8.14% 
-4.24% -6.14% 
-6.49% -16.50% 
-9.10% -10.89% 
22.14% 5.56% 
Table 4 Test Result for 3-Day Static Momentum Strategy. 
Excessive Return 
WORLD 0.8126% 
AUSTRALIA -0.8091 % 
AUSTRIA 5.1907% 
BELGIUM 1.4928 % 
CANADA 5.0218% 
DENMARK -3.2826% 
FRANCE -5.3789% 
GERMANY -1.3751 % 
HONG KONG 0.3492% 
INDONESIA 30.1692% 
ITALY 2.0943% 
JAPAN 1.4782% 
KOREA 7.7429% 
MALAYSIA 12.3835% 
NETHERLANDS -6.0285% 
NORWAY 2.5552% 
SINGAPORE 7.6328% 
SOUTH AFRICA 4.2908% 
SPAIN -3.0374% 
SWEDEN -3.7093% 
SWITZERLAND -0.1152% 
TAIWAN 11.8981 % 
THAILAND 21.9709% 
UK -3.6488% 
US -9.0814% 
Standard Error 
2.5383% 
2.4824% 
4.1313% 
3.3376% 
2.6645% 
2.1877% 
2.8170% 
3.1796% 
4.5629% 
10.3151% 
3.6556% 
3.7966% 
4.9332 % 
7.7377% 
2.1187% 
3.1494% 
4.5480% 
3.6171% 
2.3172% 
5.2252% 
3.2140% 
7.3896% 
8.0521 % 
2.5797% 
2.2606% 
Significance 
Table 5 Test Result for 6-Day Static Momentum Strategy. 
Excessive Return Standard Error 
WORLD 
AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
DENMARK 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
HONG KONG 
INDONESIA 
ITALY 
JAPAN 
KOREA 
MALAYSIA 
NETHERLANDS 
NORWAY 
SINGAPORE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
TAIWAN 
THAILAND 
UK 
us 
Significance 
5% 
10% 
Table 6 Test Result for 12-Day Static Momentum Strategy 
WORLD 
AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
DENMARK 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
HONG KONG 
INDONESIA 
ITALY 
JAPAN 
KOREA 
MALAYSIA 
NETHERLANDS 
NORWAY 
SINGAPORE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
TAIWAN 
THAILAND 
UK 
us 
Excessive Return 
-0.9440% 
-0.4327% 
0.9558% 
-5.1318% 
-0.6245% 
-4.4064% 
-5.2273 % 
-4.5536% 
-5.3319% 
17.5135% 
-2.5053% 
1.3491 % 
4.8210% 
1.4996 % 
-4.7598% 
-1.6003% 
-0.7152% 
-0.9461 % 
0.2066% 
-4.9466% 
-5.2479 % 
6.9632% 
15.3915% 
-5.5603% 
-6.8714% 
Standard Error 
3.3492% 
3.6419% 
5.1473% 
3.2718% 
4.3376% 
4.2178% 
4.8053% 
4.7009% 
7.1229% 
14.7563% 
3.7254% 
5.8629% 
5.7669% 
9.5683% 
3.3466% 
4.5332% 
6.2058% 
7.8022% 
4.0454% 
5.6354% 
3.3975% 
10.5960% 
11.6229% 
2.6624% 
3.6529% 
t-Stat Significance 
-0.2819 
-0.1188 
0.1857 - 
-1.5685 
-0.1440 
-1.0447 
-1.0878 
-0.9687 
-0.7486 
1.1868 
-0.6725 
0.2301 
0.8360 
0.1567 
-1.4223 
-0.3530 
-0.1153 
-0.1213 
0.0511 
-0.8778 
-1.5446 
0.6572 
1.3242 
-2.0885 
-1.8811 
Table 7 Test Result for Semi-Dynamic Momentum Strategy 
Excessive Return Standard Error Significance 
WORLD 
AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
DENMARK 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
HONG KONG 
INDONESIA 
ITALY 
JAPAN 
KOREA 
MALAYSIA 
NETHERLANDS 
NORWAY 
SINGAPORE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
TAIWAN 
THAILAND 
UK 
us 
Table 8 Test Result for Dynamic Momentum Strategy 
WORLD 
AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
DENMARK 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
HONG KONG 
INDONESIA 
ITALY 
JAPAN 
KOREA 
MALAYSIA 
NETHERLANDS 
NORWAY 
SINGAPORE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
TAIWAN 
THAILAND 
UK 
us 
Excessive Return Standard Error 
13.2832% 4.3658% 
3.5549% 3.2266% 
11.3330% 5.8442% 
t-Stat Significance 
3.0426 1% 
1.1017 
1 .9392 5% 
Table 9 Test Result for Oscillation (Dual Exponential Moving Average) Strategy 
Excessive Return 
WORLD 
AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
DENMARK 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
HONG KONG 
INDONESIA 
ITALY 
JAPAN 
KOREA 
MALAYSIA 
NETHERLANDS 
NORWAY 
SINGAPORE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
TAIWAN 
THAILAND 
UK 
us 
Standard Error 
2.2508% 
2.3422% 
3.4243% 
3.2252% 
3.5178% 
2.6631 % 
2.7752% 
3.9294% 
5.2600% 
10.0860% 
3.2266% 
5.4419% 
5.6727% 
7.1164% 
2.8543% 
4.2478% 
5.1721 % 
6.3458% 
3.2650% 
4.9867% 
2.6623% 
5.6370% 
7.2995% 
3.1744% 
2.2754% 
Significance 
- 
Table 10 Test Result for Relative Strength Index Strategy 
Excessive Return Standard Error t-Stat Significance 
WORLD 
AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
BELGIUM 
CANADA 
DENMARK 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
HONG KONG 
INDONESIA 
ITALY 
JAPAN 
KOREA 
MALAYSIA 
NETHERLANDS 
NORWAY 
SINGAPORE 
SOUTH AFRICA 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
TAIWAN 
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